Building on the feminist literature that traces the (re)production of militarized masculinities in and through military interventions, this article details some of the ways British soldiering subjects are being shaped in today's counterinsurgency context. Required now to be both nation builders and war fighters, contemporary soldiers are a "softer," less masculinized subjectivity, and what Alison Howell has termed "liberal warriors." British troops with their long history of colonialism and frequent overseas military campaigns are understood to be particularly suited to this role. Taking the British military's involvement in the "partnering and advising" of the Afghan National Army (ANA), this article pays attention to the interlocking gendered, raced, and sexualized discourses through which the British/Afghan encounter is experienced. Exploring first British troops' preoccupation with the perceived femininity and homosexuality of their Afghan counterparts, and second, Afghan hypermasculinity as demonstrated by the characterizations of their violent and chaotic fighting tactics, colonial logics are revealed. While British liberal warriors come to know "who they are" through these logics, (mis)represented Afghan soldiers are rendered increasingly vulnerable to the very "real," very material violences of war. 
being shaped in today's counterinsurgency context. Specifically, it unpacks interlocking discourses integral to this militarized masculinity's constitution, and how they can be traced both to Britain's past as a colonial power and to soldiers' current role in Afghanistan. Starting with a brief discussion of counterinsurgency, the ways in which its contemporary enactment can be understood as unique and how it sets the context for the emergence of a specific militarized masculinity, a "liberal warrior" is considered. The article then turns to the gendered, raced and sexualized discourses that circulated during the colonial period and the ways in which they resurface and haunt today. Focusing specifically on the British Army's involvement in the "partnering and advising" of Afghan security forces and reading primarily from Patrick Hennessey's (2012) memoir, the power and endurance of these colonial discourses is revealed. Such endurance is revealed first through British troops' preoccupation with the perceived homosexuality of the Afghan forces, and second, through the hypermasculinity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) demonstrated in their violent and "primitive" fighting tactics. While British liberal warriors construct their identities through these discourses and through this encounter, for their Afghan counterparts, such colonial logics render them increasingly vulnerable to the very "real" and very material violences of war.
A COUNTERINSURGENCY MILITARIZED MASCULINITY
Counterinsurgency is not a new form of warfare. A mainstay of nineteenthcentury colonialism, counterinsurgency was used by the British in Malaya in the 1950s and by the Americans during the Vietnam War. There is, however, something unique about the contemporary context and the British/Afghan encounter that warrants attention. In today's counterinsurgency wars, we are witness to weaponry and technological advancements that allow military personnel to be situated thousands of miles away from the targets they are engaging, while at the same time the human -as opposed to technological -body is re-centered and re-privileged on the battlefield itself. Frontline soldiers are now expected to live among local communities and win their "hearts and minds." Specific to the British case, its armed forces shrunk and empire gone, and in the face of America's overwhelming military might, counterinsurgency is where Britain can make its mark. With a history of frequent military campaigns, overseas training and imperial experience, the British are portrayed as being particularly suited to counterinsurgency soldiering. Indeed, "[e]tched into much Atlantic discourse is the notion that Britain as enlightened Greece can refine the military might of America's uncouth and untutored Rome, the old hegemon educating the new about handling the natives" (Porter 2009, 13) . From the British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster's (2005) article in Military Review detailing the US military's counterinsurgency failures in Iraq, to the American Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl's (2002) claims that the British military's organizational culture allowed it to succeed in Malaya while America failed in Vietnam, that the British military is somehow "better equipped" for counterinsurgency operations is a popular refrain.
From its outset, the war in Afghanistan has warranted feminist comment on the gendering of both the conflict itself and western militaries' practices within it. Taking place against a backdrop of the Afghan women's plight and the West's civilizational duty to protect them, while some heralded Afghanistan as the first feminist conflict, others pointed to the continuing masculinist logics of the war and silencing of Afghan women's own voices.
2 As the conflict descended into insurgency-based violence, counterinsurgency was initiated as the formal military doctrine for all ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops. Gendered both in its rhetoric -presented as a "softer" form of warfare -and its practice, for example through the use of Female Engagement Teams (see Laastad-Dyvik 2013; McBride and Wibben 2012) , counterinsurgency is often depicted as a "feminized" form of warfare, particularly in comparison to the hypermasculinized, "more mechanised . . . [and] higherfire-power" (Khalili 2011 (Khalili , 1473 wars that preceded it.
It is in and through this context that British soldiers are (re)produced and discursively idealized. Militarized masculinities are not stable and fixed subjectivities. Performatively constituted through their "doings," militarized masculinities are multiple and fluid, relational and situated: occupying positions as diverse as the "technologically sophisticated heroes" seen during the first Gulf War (Niva 1998, 119) , the "softer" and "gentler" "peacekeeper masculinity" (Duncanson 2009 ), the modern techno-fetishistic "cyborg soldier" (Masters 2005 (Masters , 2008 and the "everyday" RAF clerk (Higate 2003) . In today's shadow of counterinsurgency, Alison Howell (2011) has pointed to the ways in which soldiering subjects are now expected to be both war fighter and nation builder: to be able to engage in kinetic violence, but also know when to hold it back. Borrowing the term from Howell, today's soldiers are liberal warriors: an embodiment of militarized masculinity that has the fighting ability of a combat soldier, the high(er) technological weaponry of the Gulf War and the diplomacy and "soft power" capabilities of a peacekeeper.
However, militarized masculinities emerge not just because of a particular soldiering context, but are also relationally (re)produced through discourses of difference. While the privileging of masculinity over and above femininity is one familiar and (re)productive trope, the ways in which this gendered discourse intersects with race and sexuality will be integral both to the construction of a liberal warrior and its encounter with Afghan security forces. It is by paying attention to these discourses that logics that operated during the colonial period can be traced in today's encounters between British liberal warriors and the ANA soldiers they are sent to mentor. Before unpacking these colonial logics in a little more detail, I want to briefly expand on my understanding of the term "interlocking." I use the term following Sherene Razack who argues that while the term "intersecting" describes discrete systems whose paths cross, interlocking systems are each other and give content to one another. To quote Razack (2008, 62 -63) : "An interlocking approach requires that we keep several balls in the air at once, striving to overcome the successive process forced upon us by language, and focusing on the ways in which bodies express social hierarchies of power." Thus, while one system or discourse may provide an entry point for discussion, it is immediately evident that such an understanding is both informed by and informs others. I will detail below the ways in which gendered, raced and sexualized discourses interlock, and how they help make possible and entrench a system of inequality and violence both during the days of empire and today.
COLONIAL LOGICS
While contemporary constructions of a British militarized masculinity have emerged in response to the current environment of counterinsurgency, it is also a subjectivity that has been produced through an understanding of Britain's colonial past, and through the depiction of British men as colonial soldiers, rulers and explorers. Paying attention to colonial logics that operated during the British Empire is thus essential to understanding the ways in which contemporary British soldiering subjects come to understand their identities and experiences during overseas deployment.
The largest of the European empires, at its height the British Empire encompassed roughly a quarter of the world's total landmass, with Queen Victoria presiding over some 445 million subjects. Official rhetoric at the time sought to distance British imperialism from claims of exploitation, arguing that " [w] ith their superior race, Christian values, and economic know-how, the British instead had a duty, a moral obligation, to redeem the 'backward heathens' of the world" (Elkins 2005, 5) . Theirs was a "civilizing mission" (5) and for this rhetorical device to be effective in obscuring the violence and exploitation inherent within the imperial project, particular gendered, raced and sexualized discourses were both relied upon and (re)enacted. Such discourses would enable specific understandings of the white, western Self and non-white colonized Other.
Before even reaching their shores, pre-colonized lands were "feminized and spatially spread for male exploration"; "For centuries, the uncertain continents . . . were figured in European lore as libidinously eroticized . . . onto which Europe projected its forbidden sexual desires and fears" (McClintock 1995, 23, 22) . The Arabic-Orient, one of Europe's "deepest and most recurring images of the Other" (Said 1979, 1) , was constituted as a site of particular sexual excess, with Europe's forbidden sexual transgressions projected upon the oriental man. The oriental man was contradictorily and inconsistently portrayed as effeminized and/or homosexual, or as a lusty villain "from whom the virile but courteous European could rescue the native (or the European) woman" (Loomba 1998, 152 ).
Colonial discourses were never then "just" racial discourses. As a concept, race "receives its meanings contextually and in relation to other social groupings and hierarchies" (Loomba 1998, 122) . The British Empire and British men's understanding of who they were within it was thus supported by these interlocking discourses of difference. For example, while it was claimed that oriental men were more prone to homosexuality, such an assumption was both reinforced by and reinforces: understandings of the oriental man as more effeminate; as colonized lands harboring deviant sexualities; of the white, European man as the embodiment of masculinity and a restrained but virile sexuality; and all these understandings underwritten and interlocking with racial identity. It was the interlocking of gendered, raced and sexualized discourses such as these that helped make possible the violence of the colonial encounter. This was an encounter that for the vast majority of those affected was experienced not, as the rhetoric promised, as "a beneficent force, an exercise in enlightened development . . . [but] one of limitation, constraint, and oppression" (Levine 2007, 141) .
BENEVOLENT LIBERAL WARRIORS AND "PARTNERING AND ADVISING" THE ANA
While today the violence and brutality of the British imperialism is mostly recognized, postcolonial theorists have long pointed to the ways in which colonial logics operated during the era of empire can be traced to contemporary interventions by the West in the post-colonies and so-called "Orient" (be they "humanitarian" missions or wars of aggression). It is these colonial logics, these interlocking discourses of gender, race and sexuality, which are imbued within constructions of a liberal warrior today. There is not, however, a simple continuation of those at play during the days of empire and those deployed today. Rather, they emerge in a different language and through a different web of understandings, revolving around what soldiers think they are doing, who they think they are and their relations with those "Others" they encounter.
Claire Duncanson (2013, 102) has noted that "British soldiers do not shy away from evoking Empire explicitly themselves," often making reference to it in their memoirs. While some military personnel do so with merely a passing reference to "Lawrence of Arabia" or Rudyard Kipling, others engage in more detail with Britain's imperial past. Leo Docherty (2007, 44) , a former captain in the British Army, for example, envisions himself during his time in Afghanistan as a "latter-day Great Gamer" and describes his excitement and enthusiasm for taking part in something as "honourable" as nation building (45). Unlike the British who went into Afghanistan centuries before him, Docherty believes the "ideal opportunity to play a new version of the Great Game has presented itself" (45). This is a version that serves "NATO, not the Empire," and Docherty is confident the British "won't make such foolish errors this time around" (44). Docherty can be said to be deploying what Mary Louise Pratt (1992, 7) termed an "anti-conquest" strategy of representation. Writing about European travel and exploration writers in the colonial period, Pratt claims they secured their innocence in the imperial project through establishing themselves in opposition to the imperialists and colonialists of their times. Today, British soldiers similarly secure their innocence against claims of a "new imperialism" and their status as benevolent liberal warriors through an unhinging of the violence of the British Empire. Unlike the brutality of the Empire, contemporary interventions are in "partnership" with the local forces, and are "shaped by the will of the Afghan people" (MoD n.d.c). Despite references to "The Great Game," Britain and its military forces remain un-implicated in the bloody history of the region, nor is the long shadow of British imperialism discussed.
Focusing then on the British Army's involvement in the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army -one such "partnership" with the Afghans -I will unpack the specific ways in which colonial logics are rendered visible, how the concept of liberal warrior is (re)articulated, and how Afghan soldiers are occupying increasingly vulnerable positions. With the end of 2014 set as a deadline for British withdrawal from Afghanistan, today the balance of the UK's military effort is shifting from frontline combat to the "partnering and advising" of Afghan troops (MoD n.d.b). British troops involved with Afghan Kandak 3 Advisory Training Teams (KATTs) consist "primarily of officers and non-commissioned officers . . . who are embedded in Afghan units as mentors and trainers to the ANA" (Younoussi et al. 2009, 34) . KATTs are involved with "mentoring ANA leaders on such issues as leadership . . . implementation of doctrine, operational procedures, tactics and 'on the job training' during operations in the field," as well as providing crucial combat enablers such as fire support, command and control and close air support (35 -36). While official rhetoric makes claims to partnership and cooperation, with British troops living, eating, sleeping, patrolling and fighting "alongside soldiers of the ANA on a daily basis" (MoD n.d.a), this article claims that relations between the two forces are underwritten by haunting specters of gendered, raced and sexualized colonial logics.
Reading predominantly from Patrick Hennessey's (2012) memoir, Kandak: Fighting with Afghans, I will trace the disjuncture between the rhetoric of partnering and advising, and the interlocking discourses it is enacted through. These discourses operate to (re)produce a contemporary liberal warrior while simultaneously (mis)representing the ANA soldiers as effeminate, cowardly and primitive, rendering their bodies increasingly vulnerable to the violences of war. Hennessey's book provides much of the empirical texture of this article, principally because it is the only British soldiering memoir that deals directly and primarily with the mentoring of Afghan troops. Kandak departs from the fairly formulaic soldier-memoir that has proliferated in recent years. In particular, Hennessey's book offers a degree of self-and institutional-reflection with regard to the British Army that is seldom present in the "TiC-lit" (troopsin-combat literature) genre. Hennessey's book also, at times, offers the possibility of disrupting the colonial logics Hennessey both reproduces and is himself (re)produced in and through. However, while Hennessey (2012, 366) concludes that Afghan soldiers -askar -"are what we were: ordinary soldiers," much of his book marks a clear distinction (and hierarchy) between the extraordinary liberal warriors of the British Army and the askar of "what was basically a Soviet-legacy, Third World army" (124). A distinction is made first through a preoccupation with the perceived femininity and homosexuality of the Afghan soldiers, and second, (paradoxically), through their hypermasculinity as demonstrated by their violent and primordial fighting techniques.
THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF THE ANA
A preoccupation with the bodies of Afghan soldiers -what their bodies look like and assumptions about what they do with their bodies, particularly with regard to their sexuality -runs throughout Hennessey's and other soldiers' memoirs. Frequent and repeated references to Afghan soldiers' more effeminate appearance -their hennaed hair, their kohl-rimmed eyes and the flowers that adorn their vehicles and weaponry -litter descriptions of British soldiers' reflections on their time spent in Afghanistan. Hennessey's (2012, 22) first overwhelming impression of the ANA was that of "sheer physical difference." While Hennessey and his fellow Grenadier Guards literally embodied the archetypal masculine soldiering figure, the gestures of their body telling a story of order, discipline and control ("all over 6 foot tall . . . Giant, strapping, pink . . . with similarly cropped hair" [22] ), the ANA were "small," "scruffy as hell" and likened to children (21 -24). Feminists have long noted that the elision of women with children is one way in which women and femininity are infantilized. In Hennessey's memoir we see its inversion: the infantilization of men to implicitly feminize them. 4 Working through the same gendered hierarchical binaries -order/disorder, rationality/irrationality, control/chaos -that position women in the latter and lesser half of the dualism, the soldiers of the ANA are understood as "armed primary-school children" (346) and implicitly feminized. This feminization is compounded by the simultaneous deployment of familiar orientalist tropes of (homo)sexualization and sexual lasciviousness or deviancy.
As Said (1979) has revealed, since the late eighteenth century, the ArabicOrient has been designated as a site of particular lasciviousness and eroticism, with harems of veiled and exotic women, lustful and deviant men and a proclivity for male homosexuality. Today, ideas of sexual excess remain. Stories abound of Arab men taking multiple wives, keeping a catamite and in his first memoir Hennessey (2009, 222) recalls catching one of the Afghan interpreters "shagging a donkey through night-vision goggles." Hennessey (2012, 255) devotes close to a full chapter to the perception held by a significant number of British troops that -according to the homosexual slur of one Paratrooperthe ANA "were all bender boys." The homosociality and at times homoeroticism of the British military is no secret.
5 Yet, the tension between it and the homophobia that marks the "banter" between British troops and insults leveled toward ANA soldiers has been largely ignored by soldier memoirs. Kandak however, attempts to confront this "strange balance between the macho and the homo-erotic" (256). Hennessey writes that it never ceased to amuse him "that one of the things thousands of British troops rotating through Helmand have struggled with the most is the relative intimacy of their Afghan counterparts" (255). As he states:
It seemed hypocritical that lads who spent their days pumping iron and sculpting their sideburns found it difficult when the ANA rocked up to patrol in eye-liner. More profoundly disjointed was the overplayed horror with which the common Afghan practice of men holding hands was greeted, especially when contrasted with the ever more bizarrely sexual banter which characterized isolated [British] fighting platoons. (2012, 256) However, while Hennessey may call attention to the tensions and contradictions in British soldiers' attitudes toward their ANA counterparts, this is something of a marginal discourse in comparison to widespread allusions of the (homo)sexuality of Afghan troops. Docherty (2007, 93) , for example, writes that " [d] ue to the complete absence of any female company, intimate male relationships, sometimes homosexual, commonly develop," adding that "[t]he exact role performed by the tea-boy doting on every ANA officer is . . . a source of endless banter amongst Brits working with the Afghans." Elsewhere, a 2010 report by American social scientists (as part of the Human Terrain System Project) requested by British officers to "help them understand the sexual behavior of locals and Afghan comrades" (Farmer 2011) concluded that a "culturally-contrived homosexuality . . . appears to affect a far greater population base then [sic] researchers would argue is attributable to natural inclination" (Cardinalli 2010, 1) . Such a statement rearticulates orientalist assumptions that mark homosexuality as something "Arab" men are culturally predisposed toward. Despite the report at several points mentioning that Afghan men who practice affectionate or sexual acts with one another do not personally identify as "homosexual" -"at least not in the Western sense" (Cardinalli 2010, 4) -it frequently refers to them as such. The report states that for an Afghan man to self-identify as homosexual, he would suffer "severe tribal and familial ostracization" (5). However, to "practice homosexuality" (which implied in this report can vary from feeling love for another man, to sodomy, to being "freer with companionship, affection, emotional and artistic expression" [2]) does not carry such negative social outcomes. Cardinalli states, "it appears to be the label, not the action or the [sexual] preference, that poses the greatest problem" (5). How this compares to particular cultures in Britain -including military cultures -is not explored. Hennessey (2012, 256) , for example, recalls during his training that "rumours abounded of the lads on the Section Commanders' Battle Course who delighted in shocking their new officers by noshing each other at the bar." As one cheering onlooker to this act said at the time, it took place "to prove that he's not gay, sir" (256). Like their Afghan counterparts, it appears to be the label, not the action, which determines sexuality. As for the homophobic reaction of Afghan communities toward those who identify as homosexual, "severe tribal ostracization" may be akin to being forced to leave your career because you are an openly gay serving soldier (as was the case until 2011 in the American military), or being subjected to overtly homophobic insults within your career (common within both American and British militaries).
Understanding this discourse of (homo)sexualization as not singular and discrete but as interlocking reveals that Hennessey's own reflections give content and form to the very assumptions he seeks to avoid. For while he actively avoids making sweeping assumptions with regard to the sexuality of his Afghan counterparts, his own production through, and engagement in, discourses that "make" a liberal warrior operate to implicitly rearticulate this (homo)sexualized representation. For example, Hennessey's overwhelming impression that the ANA were "small" (2012, 21), his frequent references to the ANA's "immaculately tended garden[s]" (157) on bases (often at the expense of troops performing their soldiering duties) and their behavior while out on operations ("[t]he night was peppered with angry shouts and nervous, random shots at ghosts and shadows" [89] ), all work through and emerge from particular gendered -feminizing -discourses. Thus, while Hennessey may be amused at others' affront at the affection shown between Afghan men and their presumed homosexuality, his own preoccupation with their "effeminate" appearance entangles him in these same logics. Despite his reflection on the homoeroticism of the British military, British soldiers remain resolutely heterosexual, and by extension, masculine. Homosexuality was policed against not only by homophobic assumptions leveled at the ANA, 6 but also by the raw physical masculinity of British soldiers' appearance and their "manly" fighting ability.
It is worth noting here that Kandak, like the vast majority of the "TiC-lit" genre, is marked by an absence of women. It is a book about a man and his relationships with other men. The most oft-mentioned woman is Jen, Hennessey's partner, whose mentions serve to remind the reader that while Hennessey is in a warzone, Jen remains at home. Given that militarized masculinities are inherently relational and rely upon ideas of lacking and weak femininities, such femininities are transposed from the bodies of absent women onto the bodies of the present ANA. For not only do liberal warriors emerge against a backdrop of the imperiled Afghan woman, they are also (re)produced through their relations with non-hegemonic men whose bodies have been marked as effeminate and homosexualized. As such, it is through British soldiers' encounters and relations with their Afghan counterparts that they come to know themselves as masculine and heterosexual liberal warriors.
However, British soldiers do not only come to know "who they are," the encounter is also fraught with desire. This desire is not just of Afghan bodies, as seen in Hennessey and others' obsession with the appearance and sexual behaviors of Afghan soldiers, but also desire of what these bodies do. With Afghan soldiers' bodies subject to intense scrutiny and often the object of fear, loathing and homophobia, and desire understood as an oscillation between repulsion and attraction with the latter overcome through violence, this simultaneous preoccupation and vehemence suggests desire is at play.
UNWILLING FIGHTERS/KHARKUS FIGHTERS
Given the importance of masculine gender and heterosexual competency to soldiering in western militaries, 7 it follows from the above interlocking discourses that British soldiers responsible for the training of Afghan troops voice concerns over their combat ability. Frequently mentioned in soldiers' recollections of the ANA, official reports and media stories are issues with regard to the ANA's discipline, and their fear of, and an unwillingness to engage in fighting. The ANA are portrayed as incredibly adept at disengaging themselves from the possibility of working, training or fighting. Docherty (2007, 88) voices his frustration that while he is desperate "to be properly 'embedded' with the Afghans, to truly get to know them and turn the company into a slick, effective unit . . . they're not really interested in doing any serious training." Reaction on an online military forum to Docherty's disappointment is largely scathing, with one contributor commenting that Docherty encountered just "a couple of small issues . . . such as, Afghans are lazy as f[uc]k and don't want to learn to fight, instead they are more content with picking flowers, drinking tea, and enjoying 'Man-Love Thursday'" (MilitaryForums 2007).
8 Voicing similar, if more measured, sentiments, Hennessey (2012, 45) recalls that each time he "decided to do some training with whoever was there . . . a mysterious bell would ring, and the ANA would all disappear on cue -prayers, lunch, siesta, we never really knew to where."
The assumption that the ANA were lazy and unwilling to fight is not just held by individual soldiers. Kandak suggests this is something of an institutional attitude within the British military and that this has enacted a "writing out of history" of the ANA's combat achievements and successes. Hennessey (2012, 33) claims that at "every stage" of his pre-deployment mentoring training, "the Afghans themselves were dismissed . . . they were infantilized: were children, boys, novices who needed hand-holding and baby-sitting." ANA involvement and successes during field operations failed to be reported in the same ways and to the same extent as their assumed laziness. The twenty-page "Royal Anglians' quasi-official history of their tour" fails to note a single mention of the ANA (98), while one recollection of a joint UK-ANA operation describes it as being "about 240 Brits altogether, with the ANA in the rear" (McNab as quoted in Hennessey 2012, 98) . Hennessey (2012, 98 ) recalls this same fight, but describes how ANA soldier Zadiq Ullah was "shot through the eye storming the Taliban positions" and how ANA Sergeant Nadir "broke cover and drove the Dushka [the Soviet heavy machine-gun] wagon right up to the front line with bullets pinging off the bumper." In Hennessey's recollection, the ANA were frontline soldiers engaging enemy positions, not the lazy, warshy children they are frequently depicted as.
An unwillingness, or even inability to fight, however, is not a reaction exclusive to the ANA and can be re-read as a form of agency or resistance. First, history is littered with stories of men who, having joined the military, find themselves unable to fight. Hennessey, on one of his returns to Afghanistan as a civilian witnesses this while on patrol with British forces. Under fire, Hennessey finds himself in a cold ditch with a hyperventilating young soldier "curled up next to" him. Looking over at the soldier, Hennessey (2012, 163 -164) notes he is "breathing at a rate of knots and cradling the Minimi [light machine gun] like a safety blanket." Second, ANA soldiers' unwillingness to fight or their seeming lack of discipline may in fact be a form of what James Scott (1985, xvi) has termed "everyday forms of resistance." Studying struggles "between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them" Scott (1985, xvi) details the "ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups." Such weapons include foot dragging, desertion and false compliance, and are what the peasantry have historically enacted in order to defend their interests against orders they had faced (xvi). The ANA -who have been perceived as having engaged in a number of these "ordinary weapons" -may utilize such tactics in response to the very real security threats they face. Hennessey (2012, 122) alludes to this in his reflections of the ANA's behavior when it came to his handing over of training responsibilities to another regiment: Suddenly, the ANA started showing off and being almost pointedly ill-disciplined . . . It made me wonder whether the worst we had seen of the kandak, now nearly seven months earlier, hadn't perhaps been similarly exaggerated, part of a pantomime, the only way the powerless kandak could register its displeasure.
Paradoxically, representations of the ANA are not just feminized through their unwillingness or fear of fighting, but are also hypermasculinized through their portrayal as being excessively violent and brutal. Qiam, an ANA soldier described by Hennessey (2012, 186) as "this story's hero" is at the center of numerous anecdotes reflecting his mad love of the fight. In one particularly memorable scene after an Afghan policeman refuses to fight on account of not having body armor, Qiam strips out of his own armor and clothing and throws his gun at another policeman before picking up a wrench and charging into the battle (87 -88). Describing Qiam, Hennessey uses an Afghan word, kharkus, meaning a mix of crazy and brave (88). In descriptions of the ANA's fighting, there is a mixture of envy and reservation. There is envy in the abandonment of restraint; Qiam's behavior after all is not that of a counterinsurgency liberal warrior. Unlike the controlled and disciplined fighting of British soldiers, the fighting of the ANA -when they do fight -is more chaotic, violent, kharkus. And it is here, in these reflections, that desire is once again revealed. While British soldiers are directed by instrumental purposes, carry highly technologized weaponry, and engage in complex battle plans, for Afghan fighters, "conflict had a meaning of its own. Warfare was a calling, affirming a way of life and expressing existential values" (Porter 2009, 39) . Orientalism, "a mixed bag of self-glorification and self-doubt" (29), means that the ANA and their actions are both desired and disparaged, both envied and derided.
A liberal warrior is a very specific conception of masculinity, and one in which discipline and control are integral. Expected not only to be able to deploy lethal force but to know when to hold back, a liberal warrior's recourse to violence is underwritten with the assumption that it is legitimate, proportionate, and controlled. The ANA's lack of discipline, from their failure to wear correct uniform to their uncontrolled and chaotic actions in combat, suggests an excess of masculinity -an excess that makes it impossible that they could ever embody a liberal warrior subjectivity such as Hennessey's. As Hennessey (2012, 274) writes, reflecting on the shift toward "hearts and minds" in counterinsurgency warfare:
The unquestioned fighting spirit of the ANA which had won it so many admirers in the past was of less value in the softly-softly-catchy-monkey world of counterinsurgency, where it was all about winning the population, not the fire-fight. General McChrystal's 9 mantra of "courageous restraint" was difficult enough for some of the more experienced ISAF troops to get their heads around . . . but it was complete anathema to the ANA.
Near the end of Hennessey's memoir, this quote is both interesting and revealing. First, it seems a little disingenuous to state that the fighting spirit of the ANA was "unquestioned" by their British counterparts, given that large sections of the book were given over to exactly this questioning. Second, it is interesting that once the military focus shifted toward a "hearts and minds" campaign as opposed to "winning the fire-fight," this is now where British liberal warriors excel. At the beginning of his memoir, Hennessey (2012, 91) recalls how the ANA "handed out sweets to kids" and "chatted away to the few farmers", all the while depending on the British "for coordination, combat support, all the stuff that would win battles" (74). In these earlier reflections, counterinsurgency has been implicitly divided into masculine war fighting (carried out by the British) and feminine "hearts and minds" campaigning (carried out by the ANA).
That the ANA can be simultaneously feminized and hypermasculinized in this way, while at the same time a British liberal warrior's privileged position is maintained, demonstrates the power of the interlocking discourses and the difficulty of stepping outside them. The gendered, raced and sexualized discourses that work to (re)produce a British liberal warrior and their relation with the ANA creates the content and form that prove so enduring. For example, constructing an ANA soldier as more effeminate than his British counterpart interlocks with the construction of an ANA soldier being more culturally predisposed to homosexuality, to a fear or unwillingness to fight and to a child-like demeanor. However, that an ANA soldier has a greater proclivity toward homosexuality also informs, and is informed by, a more general sexual lasciviousness or deviance, a lack of discipline and more "primitive" behavior such as chaotic or hypermasculinized forms of fighting. These two seemingly contradictory understandings therefore do in fact emerge from, and play into one another.
Despite the impossibility of separating out individual discourses and the endurance this engenders, that identifications of ANA soldiers emerge through multiple points and multiple ways of this interlocking web also offers the possibility of rendering unstable borders mapped between western liberal warriors and Afghan askar. It offers the possibility of British soldiers engaging in other, less exclusionary discourses, and engendering a less hierarchical militarized masculinity. Claire Duncanson (2013, 114) in her reading of British soldier memoirs argues that western military interventions do not always inevitably rely on radical Othering. Duncanson details evidence of a different militarized masculinity emerging through British soldiers' encounters with the Iraqi and Afghan populations: a "peacebuilding masculinity" constructed "through relations of equality, empathy and respect" (148). Hennessey's refusal to homosexualize the ANA and his recognition of their fighting ability begins to disrupt and render unstable the hierarchical Othering relation between the two soldiering subjects. However, as Duncanson also acknowledges, such disruptions are not the dominant discourse; as has been shown, while disruptions take place and are significant, the interlocking nature of the discourses reveals it can be easy to revert back to a colonialist and hierarchical relationship. It is then to a deeper reflection of these interlocking discourses that my conclusion turns, and how despite Hennessey's reflections offering some disruption, they remain haunted by the gendered, raced and sexualized colonial logics he tries so hard from which to extricate himself.
CONCLUSION
Produced not just through the recent turn toward the gendered rhetoric and practice of counterinsurgency, but also through Britain's history as a colonial power, a "liberal warrior" is today's militarized masculine embodiment. And while the violence and exploitation of the British Empire is now largely recognized, the gendered, raced and sexualized discourses that circulated and interlocked during the colonial period continue to haunt and (re)articulate a contemporary liberal warrior according to particular logics. For although military rhetoric on Afghanistan today centers on words such as "partnership," and British soldiers understand their role as being in the service of international security as opposed to empire, the encounter between British troops and their Afghan counterparts serves to largely uphold a hierarchical relationship between a superior white liberal warrior and inferior non-white "Other." Considering the British military's role in "partnering and advising" the Afghan security forces, this article has traced the ways in which these interlocking discourses both produce and sustain this hierarchy.
Unlike much of the "TiC-lit" that has proliferated in recent years, Hennessey's memoir offers a degree of self-and institutional-reflection that is quite rare. Writing about the ANA, he frequently compares their supposedly effeminate, homosexualized, or lazy behavior with that of British troops, drawing attention to the ways in which both subjects actually engage in similar performances. Indeed, Hennessey's contextualizations do, at times, disrupt the radical Othering and dominant colonialist discourses that are at work. However, what makes these colonialist discourses so difficult to challenge, what makes them so enduring, is the ways in which they interlock and give content and form to one another, and the ease at which subjects both unthinkingly (re)articulate them and are (re)produced by them. For example, while Hennessey acknowledges the disjuncture between British soldiers' unease with Afghan soldiers' tactility, and the intense homoeroticism of the British military, he too inadvertently (re)iterates these same assumptions. For while Hennessey may not regard the ANA as "bender boys" as one of his colleagues does, he does feminize them with frequent references to their love of flowers, kohl-rimmed eyes and diminutive stature. Gendered and raced discourses such as these give content and form to the very (homo)-sexualized discourses from which Hennessey attempts to disentangle himself. Similarly, while Hennessey makes an explicit attempt to "write in" the ANA's fighting ability and their contribution to kinetic operations, thus disrupting claims that they are cowardly and lazy, he simultaneously falls back into familiar colonial logics. There are several examples such as Hennessey's frequent references to the ANA's reliance on the better equipped, more highly trained and technologically advanced British military; or his descriptions of their fighting, portrayed as chaotic, mad and at times hyper-violent. Unlike British liberal warriors who draw on controlled and precise fighting tactics when going into combat, Afghan soldiers are chaotic, out of control. Anecdotes such as these re-entangle Hennessey and the ANA in interlocking webs of colonial logics. Despite Hennessey's (2012, 10 -11) appeals that the askar of the ANA were "no different from the British soldiers they have fought alongside," these logics give content and form to orientalist discourses that portray the ANA as feminized, infantilized, homosexualized, primitive; as irrefutably different from the disciplined and controlled masculine liberal warriors.
Hennessey's contextualizations and attempts to move beyond the dominant discourses are further restricted by the ubiquity of the colonial terms the Afghan mission is portrayed and understood through. As Derek Gregory (2004, 16) 
has written:
The colonial present is not produced through geopolitics and geoeconomics alone . . . It is also set in motion through mundane cultural forms and cultural practices that mark other people as irredeemably "Other" and that license the unleashing of exemplary violence against them.
It is this "banality of the colonial present" (16, emphasis in original) and the fact that Afghanistan is unconsciously understood in colonial terms that help make these interlocking discourses so effective and so difficult to escape.
Hennessey wrote his memoir in an attempt to give ordinary Afghan soldiers a voice, aware of the difficulties, imbalances and even dangers of attempting to tell O/others' stories. He writes in a self-conscious and, at times, self-reflective manner, recognizing the flippancy the ANA are frequently afforded and the inconsistencies that mark British soldiers' attitudes toward them. However, despite his attempts at disrupting the dominant colonialist discourses, he too does not fully escape the gendered, raced and sexualized colonial logics of much of what he critiques. It is not, after all, possible to simply step "outside" discourse. Hennessey, as all political subjects, is produced in and through discourse, and as a former British soldier, his subjectivity displays the "marks" of colonial discourse more vividly than others. To destabilize these logics, to attempt to discard them, is to trouble who he understands himself to be. Hennessey's self-reflection may indeed be a way to bolster his own position as innocent in Britain's ongoing involvement in Afghanistan, while simultaneously upholding the discourses and logics that allow him to understand himself as militarized and masculinized, offering a degree of comfort. What effects, however, does this have on the subjugated Others that are simultaneously produced? For the ANA, who are assigned "the most under-strength or least trained or most-unknown unit" who "are forever cast in the role of the supported" (Hennessey 2012, 328) and who are written out of battles and written out of history? For the ANA, who have died in numbers far exceeding their British "partners," 10 these interlocking discourses have far more violent effects than mere misrepresentation. They locate the ANA in violent relations of power where they are underresourced and underfunded, where their bodies are left on battlefields 11 and where they are expected to patrol in conditions the British would refuse.
12 It is the on-the-ground "realities" such as these -the mundane, banal and "everyday" actions of underfunding and different rules -which reveal that contextualizations such as Hennessey's do little to disturb the dominant colonialist discourses. For ANA soldiers, these interlocking discourses lead not to a "knowingness" of who they are, but render them increasingly vulnerable in a war initiated by outside forces who are soon to disengage.
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